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OWNING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE: THE RISE
OF OPEN INNOVATION AND THE FUTURE
OF PATENT LAW
INTRODUCTION

M

ost people are familiar with the story of the genius inventor, toiling away for years in a basement laboratory to one day emerge
with the perfect solution to age old problems. Whether lighting our
homes, cutting grass, or allowing instant telecommuting, innovation has
propelled our societies forward and become one of the driving forces of
economic success. The classic model of patent protection emerged to
encourage the inventive process by rewarding the inventor with the exclusive right to profit from public dissemination of the invention.1
However, the narrative of the lone inventor has faded over the years as
technological advances, especially the internet, have resulted in dramatic
changes to the innovative landscape.2 The knowledge sharing potential in
today’s globalizing world has created an ever increasing demand for fast,
accessible, and far reaching innovation.3 Further, innovation is now frequently an interdisciplinary, networked process from creation to distribution, a process that often proves impossible for the lone inventor.4 Even
companies—the drivers of innovation activities today—have adapted
traditional in-house research and development (“R&D”) models to access
the knowledge necessary to make technologically complex products,5 to
1. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, EUROPEAN PATENT ORGANISATION, SCENARIOS FOR
FUTURE 9 (2007), available at http://www.epo.org/topics/patent-system/scenariosfor-the-future.html.
2. Katherine J. Strandburg, Accommodating User Innovation in the International
Intellectual Property Regime: A Global Administrative Law Approach, 2009 ACTA
JURIDICA 283, 283; Keith Sawyer, The Collaborative Nature of Innovation, 30 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 293, 308 (2009).
3. José Cláudia Terra, Collaboration in R&R: The Emerging Frontiers of Innovation, TERRAFORUM CONSULTORES 2, http://biblioteca.terraforum.com.br/Paginas/
CollaborationinRDTheEmergingFrontiersofInnovation.aspx (last visited May 18, 2010);
see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OPEN
INNOVATION IN GLOBAL NETWORKS 15 (2008) [hereinafter OECD]; Koen De Backer,
Vladimir Lopez-Bassols & Catalina Martinez, Open Innovation in a Global Perspective—What do Existing Data Tell Us? 7 (Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., STI Working
Paper 2008/4, 2008), available at http://www.oecdilibrary.org/oecd/content/
workingpaper/230073468188.
4. OECD, supra note 3, at 15; John Dubiansky, The Role of Patents in Fostering
Open Innovation, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH 7, 3 (2006) (“Ideas are created from the recombination of elements from various firms and in various industries.”); De Backer, LopezBassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7.
5. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 17, 88; Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007); SawyTHE
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share exorbitant development costs,6 to mitigate risk,7 and to compete on
the forefront of global intellectual property markets.8
The future of innovation is an “open,” collaborative, global approach
to R&D.9 To promote successful development of this trend, international
patent reform must account for the changing modes of innovation and the
new role of intellectual property in business strategies.10 Moreover, instead of focusing solely on patent harmonization, the conversation must
shift to reevaluate the underlying goals of patent law. Rather than focusing on the ardent protection of ideas, the patent regime should work to
facilitate the flow of knowledge and to police a growing international
intellectual property market.
“Open innovation,” coined in 2003, is a new way of thinking about
technology production and innovation that assumes that companies benefit most when they utilize ideas and paths to market that are both internal
and external.11 The key to the theory of open innovation is that firms
open their doors to the free flow of ideas, allowing capitalization of technologies wherever most expedient, thus increasing the competitiveness
of all market players.12 Firms employ a growing division and specialization of innovation labor in a kind of reciprocal outsourcing model.13
These strategies hinge on the most efficient use of intellectual property—
whether that entails finding needed technology to complete internal
R&D, selling unused intellectual property, or collaborating on freely distributed knowledge.14 One well-known example of open innovation is
“open source,” a popular means of producing software for which the
source code is freely accessible as long as users comply with license
terms which usually forbid restrictive redistribution or inclusion in a

er, supra note 2, at 303–04; Gene Slowinski & Matthew W. Sagal, Allocating Patent
Rights in Collaborative Research Agreements, RES. TECH. MGMT, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 51.
6. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 18.
7. OECD, supra note 3, at 41; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3,
at 7.
8. Cf. OECD, supra note 3, at 27 (“Changes in the marketplace—globalisation
among them—require companies to be open to external ideas that supplement internal
R&D in order to remain competitive.”).
9
Sawyer, supra note 2, at 312.
10
Cf. id. at 318.
11. HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING
AND PROFITING FROM TECHONOLOGY xxiv (2003).
12. See generally id.
13. See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: HOW TO THRIVE IN THE NEW
INNOVATION LANDSCAPE 1–2, 56–57 (2006).
14. See generally CHESBROUGH, supra note 11.
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commercially sold product which locks access to the original code.15
Thus, in practice, open innovation takes various forms that span a continuum of collective and proprietary intellectual property creation and use.
This Note explores the open innovation model with International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) as its example. IBM is one of the
world’s largest information technology companies to begin employing
open innovation strategies after a “near death experience” induced a strategic shift in its innovation trajectory.16 In 1992, IBM recorded the largest quarterly and annual losses in U.S. corporate history.17 This wake-up
call resulted in a complete strategic overhaul with a particular emphasis
on open innovation.18 While IBM is not the first, or only, company to
expand R&D outside its four walls, the range and global reach of its innovation programs19 and its highly visible position in the marketplace
make it a natural case study.20
There is skepticism as to whether IBM can make this business model
work as there are significant concerns regarding the issue of global intellectual property rights.21 Without doubt, IBM must employ significant
efforts to coordinate and manage its extensive patent portfolio, especially
with the magnitude of its open innovation programs and the accompanying variations on intellectual property ownership.22 Regardless of the
agility of IBM’s attorneys to navigate complex intergovernmental patent
systems, the question remains whether the world’s various patent systems can support IBM. Under the governance of international patent law,
which is based on a fixed standard of mass market, seller-based innova-

15. Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Challenges of Open Innovation: the Paradox of
Firm Investment in Open-Source Software, 36 R&D MANAGEMENT 319, 322 (2006);
Sawyer, supra note 2, at 321.
16. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 101; Video: Address of David Yuan, Vice President of Corporate Communications, IBM, at the Collaborative Innovation Summit, held
by Business Innovation Factory-4 (Oct. 15–16, 2008), available at http://www.
businessinnovationfactory.com/ iss/video/bif4-david-yaun.
17. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 101 (reporting a loss of $4.96 billion after taxes).
18. Id. at 102.
19. Steve Hamm, Big Blue’s Global Lab, BUS. WK., Sept. 7, 2009, at 40, 42 (“The
depth of [the] collaboration, the number of partners, the staff involved, and its global
reach set IBM apart.”).
20. This Note makes no endorsement or criticism of IBM or its practices. Rather, the
singular focus on IBM programs as illustrations of open innovation is purely for the purpose of consistency.
21. Hamm, supra note 19, at 42.
22. See generally, Athena Ma, IBM Patent Leadership: Balances Proprietary and
Collaborative Innovation, CHINA IP, Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 24, available at
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=250.
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tion,23 open innovation may flounder in its more audacious goals of patent liberalization and collaborative development. Further, the disparate
nature of global patent law and the increase of value placed on intellectual property assets have resulted in various obstacles to the functioning
global patent regime.
As more multinational and transnational companies are beginning to
employ open innovation models, issues arise on a global scale. The creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) “deepened the deregulatory logic of economic globalization” and linked intellectual property
rights to global trade, leading to territorial expansion.24 The Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (“TRIPs”) incorporated into the WTO, helped to streamline global intellectual property rights. Patent law, however, is still largely territorial in nature—there
is no single global patent registry, and the multiplicity of applications
necessitates country-by-country monitoring and enforcement. This international state of patent law leads to significant costs and uncertainties for
global ventures employing open innovation strategies.
While business models have evolved and adapted to a newly integrated
world, patent law continues to reflect a defensive, sales-oriented, proprietary model25 which may be incongruous with open innovation.26 Despite
this lag in patent law rationale, businesses have shifted their operations
and are taking an offensive approach to patents, which are now the
means by which knowledge is shared and built rather than controlled.27
Additionally, the value of global businesses is increasingly measured
with intangible assets protected and utilized by intellectual property, rather than physical assets.28 “Patent registration is now no longer an expensive way to placate engineers—it is a primary means to generate value.”29
This Note posits that for the continued development and growth of
open innovation, international patent law harmonization must take on
new dimensions. Due consideration must be given to the expanded role
that intellectual property assets play in today’s global business strategies
and the ways in which patent law can better facilitate the active man23. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 285.
24. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 9, 22.
25. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 284.
26. Cf. Sawyer, supra note 2, at 297 (“[T]he current IP regime is based almost entirely on the linear model of innovation. If that model is inaccurate, then the IP regime currently is designed to work with an inaccurate conception of the innovation process.”).
27. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 9; see OECD, supra note 3, at 103.
28. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 17.
29. Id.
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agement of these rights. However, this is not enough; the underlying
goals of the patent regime must be reevaluated. Rather than a defensive
exclusion of others, intellectual property rights should serve to further
knowledge production, ease the sharing of ideas, and promote and police
an ever growing international intellectual property market.
Part I of this Note explores the evolution of open innovation, its components, its globalization, and its interaction with intellectual property.
Part II explains the international agreements and domestic laws that constitute international patent law in order to show that despite the move
toward harmonization, patent law remains stuck in the past. Part III discusses the main themes of current patent reform and the implications for
open innovation. Part IV argues that efforts toward harmonization are in
fact misdirected because the only way to fully support the changing
global landscape is a complete paradigm shift in the underlying logic of
patent rights.
I. OPEN INNOVATION
In an age of globalization, competition comes from all corners of the
world, knowledge is increasingly multidisciplinary and widespread, investment in R&D is on the rise, and product lifecycles are shortening.30
With such fierce and dispersed competition, and equally diverse and demanding consumers, innovation is an important means to secure market
share and build a sustainable business.31 Companies have thus been faced
with a “sink or swim” situation;32 they have been forced to adapt to these
challenges by innovating the way they innovate. One response has been
the adoption of “open” models of innovation—companies search outside
their firm for complementary assets, expertise, and research, in order to
swiftly access new and different technologies and capitalize on their own
unused intellectual property.33 These R&D activities are also increasingly
global, as firms explore new markets and local knowledge bases.34 Open
innovation is a targeted response to today’s interconnected world as it

30. OECD, supra note 3, at 15; Terra, supra note 3, at 2; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols &
Martinez, supra note 3, at 7.
31. OECD, supra note 3, at 15.
32. Cf. OECD, supra note 3, at 27 (stating “[c]hanges in the marketplace—
globalisation among them—require companies to be open to external ideas that supplement internal R&D in order to remain competitive”).
33. OECD, supra note 3, at 15; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3,
at 7.
34. OECD, supra note 3, at 15
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results in faster, more efficient innovation by employing intellectual
property assets as the catalysts of knowledge production.35
A. The Rise of Open Innovation
Innovation methods are constantly changing and adapting to new circumstances.36 The iconic “lone inventor” was indeed a prominent figure
in nineteenth century American innovation and, consequently, the patent
market of the time.37 Fast forward to an industrialized world and the rise
of the multinational enterprise (“MNE”) and witness R&D models that
are completely internal, in-house, and closed to outsiders.38 This “closed
innovation” system relies on the assumption that “successful innovation
requires control.”39 This creates a “virtuous circle”—companies invest in
internal R&D, make discoveries, use these discoveries to create new
products and services, reap profits, and reinvest in further R&D, all of
which leads to additional breakthroughs.40 The intellectual property generated from internal R&D is usually guarded closely to prevent unwanted
imitation.41 In order to compete in this system, firms must have significant resources and the ability to commit to lengthy research programs.42
Hence, giant corporate research laboratories such as Bell Labs and the
Palo Alto Research Center (“PARC”) dominated the innovation scene of
that time and contributed to the creation of global industry leaders such
as AT&T, IBM, and Xerox.43 Indeed, from 1945 to 1980, IBM was the
central player in the computer industry, “built on internal innovation
[and] proprietary control over the architecture and all its key elements . .
. .”44
During the last years of the twentieth century, changes in the global
landscape eroded the logic of closed innovation.45 The growing availability and mobility of skilled workers led to a diffusion of knowledge and a

35. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 9.
36. ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 3–5 (1988).
37. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 169 (2008) (citing B. ZORINA
KAHN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005)); see Sawyer, supra note 2, at 322.
38. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at xix; OECD, supra note 3, at 18, 25.
39. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at xx.
40. Id. at xx–xxi.
41. Id. at xxi.
42. Id. at xix.
43. See id. at xviii–xix.
44. Id. at 93, 96.
45. Id. at xxii.
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fluid labor market which further dispersed technical know-how.46 With
large numbers of skilled graduates entering the job market, more companies could tap into their talent without the traditionally insurmountable
costs of R&D.47 Additionally, increased labor mobility resulted in further
diffusion of knowledge as employees of R&D giants left their jobs to
pursue careers with suppliers, customers, or start-ups who paid a premium for their training and experience. IBM felt the blow of this development, for example, when one of its engineers left the company and
shared his knowledge of disk-drive technology with two competitors,
contributing to the erosion of IBM’s disk-drive dominance.48
The leakage of intellectual property rights that once “sat on the shelf”
also contributed to the erosion of closed innovation.49 In a closed system,
innovation that does not fit the company’s needs or business strategy remains unused, “on the shelf,” collecting dust.50 However, with the increase of firms utilizing R&D, disillusioned employees sought out alternative means to utilize their unused discoveries.51 These ideas were
brought to market without the original company that funded the creative
R&D.52 Thus, despite the in-house control of closed innovation knowledge production, leakage of unused ideas led to an increase in external
suppliers of specialized, technical components.53 This proliferation of
suppliers undermined the logic of closed innovation by providing previously inaccessible knowledge and technology to a broader market.54
Closed innovators found themselves faced with increased competition
and pressure from those that already utilize various sources of knowledge.55
Open innovation signals a paradigm shift that encourages innovators to
integrate external ideas and technology into their own internal R&D, as
well as to control the flow of unused ideas and direct them to the most
efficient users on the outside.56 Companies cannot ignore the diffusion of
knowledge production. Data shows that small firms—those with less
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 40.
OECD, supra note 3, at 18.
CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 38.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40.
CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at xiii; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE
ECONOMIST, SHARING THE IDEA: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL INNOVATION NETWORKS 10
(2007) [hereinafter EIU].
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than a thousand employees—account for a growing proportion of R&D
spending.57 Further, universities conducting research around the world
are more in tune today with industry needs58 and produce more qualified
graduates ready to work than ever before.59 These facts suggest that the
playing field for innovation is leveling and that there are fewer economies of scale in R&D than there once were.60 Additionally, technological
advances, such as the internet, make dispersed knowledge easier to
access and less costly.61 The days of highly centralized corporate R&D
laboratories and knowledge monopolies are gone and companies can no
longer disregard the contribution of smaller, less traditional innovators.62
Adaptive companies have developed the tools to leverage multiple
paths to market for their technology by accepting a new logic of innovation that leverages and exploits existing internal and external knowledge.63 “Companies’ solid boundaries are being transformed into a semipermeable membrane that enables innovation to move more easily between the external environment and the companies’ internal innovation
process.”64 Cooperation is an essential means of knowledge-sourcing65
and the partnerships that are created in these collaborations are “as important as the ownership of the actual knowledge.”66 Of course, utilizing
external knowledge is not an entirely new phenomenon; however, it
takes place much more rapidly today and is distinguished by the systematic integration of the strategy into the overall business model.67

57. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 22–23 (detailing statistics from the National
Science Foundation showing that small firms accounted for almost 25% of total industry
spending).
58. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 41.
59. EIU, supra note 57, at 7 (reporting that “India produces 1 million Englishspeaking graduates a year and, by 2008, it will have more technology graduates than the
population of the UK”).
60. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 23 & n.2.
61. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 44.
62. Id. at 45–49. Chesbrough also notes that larger companies used to be skeptical of
the quality of R&D from smaller firms. However, reports from the larger laboratories
suggest that the competition for hiring researchers out of top Ph.D. programs comes not
from other lab giants but from small start-ups and universities.
63. Id. at 51.
64. OECD, supra note 3, at 18.
65. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7.
66. OECD, supra note 3, at 25.
67. Id. at 24; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7.
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B. Modes of Open Innovation
The open innovation business model is essentially a division of innovation labor.68 Value is created by leveraging more ideas, some of which
originate externally, and value is captured more effectively by using key
assets both inside and outside the business.69 In other words, companies
look both “outside-in” and “inside-out” in this dynamic innovation model.70 Ultimately, this setup makes it possible for ideas to reach the market
more quickly and efficiently than when one company is responsible for
the idea from start to finish.71
Companies employ open innovation strategies in a variety of ways.
Modes of “outside-in” innovation include: the purchase or licensing of
technology; joint ventures; joint development; collaboration within and
across industries; equity in outside projects; and pooled R&D.72 IBM
employs many of these techniques, forming strategic collaborative partnerships, called “collaboratories,” with universities, customers, and other
firms to combine resources and skills.73 For example, in 2008, an IBM
laboratory in California teamed up with Yale University to research algorithms aimed at helping analyze medical images and videos for the purpose of cardiac disease analysis.74 IBM also uses online brainstorming
sessions, called “Innovation Jams” to assess the value of external
projects.75 In 2006, one Innovation Jam brought together over 150,000
people from 104 countries and 67 companies.76 Some 46,000 ideas were
posted by participants and, in the end, IBM pledged $100 million to collaboratively pursue ten new businesses generated through the exercise.77
The portfolio included initiatives such as real time translation services,
3D internet and a banking system capable of reaching remote locations in
emerging market countries.78

68. See CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 1–2, 56–57
69. Id. at 2.
70. OECD, supra note 3, at 18.
71. EIU, supra note 57, at 10.
72. OECD, supra note 3, at 37; WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 323.
73. Research and Development, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ie/emerging_business
_centre/research.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
74. Collaborative Research Initiatives, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/
university/collaborativeresearch/projects.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
75. OECD, supra note 3, at 101.
76. Press Release, IBM, IBM Invests $100 Million in Collaborative Innovation Ideas
(Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/20605.wss
[hereinafter IBM Press Release]
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The outbound—or, “inside-out”—innovation strategy is a newer development that allows for the exploitation of in-house knowledge that
has yet to be commercialized.79 Modes of “inside-out” innovation also
include licensing, joint ventures, and venture capital, as well as internal
corporate venturing, and divesting—or, “spinning out”—unused technologies.80 IBM licenses a considerable amount of technology and also sells
internally-developed technology components to its competitors.81 These
tactics work to make the technology more cost-effective, especially when
fierce competition bars IBM from controlling or maintaining a competitive edge in any one branch of technology.82 Another radical innovation
strategy is IBM’s internal corporate venturing through an internal website they call the “Thinkplace.”83 Acting like an internal market, employees post ideas and proposals and their colleagues vote on them.84
The highest rated ideas move on to the next stage where a manager sponsors and takes ownership of each idea’s development.85 Three to four
employees from around the world form a team and allocate one day a
week to work on the project.86 In this way, IBM invests and capitalizes
on its employees and encourages cross-border collaboration.
C. Globalized Open Innovation
Globalization has collapsed the world of R&D, dramatically expanding
the number of potential partners in the development of global innovation
networks.87 Firms forge these networks by building their own R&D facilities abroad and by collaborating with local partners and suppliers in foreign countries.88 Locations for R&D investment are often based on a
country’s technological infrastructure as well as the firm’s abilities to
grasp trends in local markets, to benefit from local knowledge and skilled
personnel, to access technology and spillover from other R&D activities,
to support local manufacturing facilities, and to form strategic alliances
with universities or government institutions.89 In this regard, emerging
79. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 8.
80. OECD, supra note 3, at 38, 40.
81. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 109.
82. See id. at 108.
83. OECD, supra note 3, at 97
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 8; see OECD, supra note
3, at 33.
88. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 8.
89. OECD, supra note 3, at 30–32; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note
3, at 8.
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countries are increasingly attractive because of low costs and, where the
education system is strong, a large number of trained researchers.90 Lower costs are attractive for any business, but the allure isn’t only about the
bottom line; there is also the potential for smaller companies—those that
would not otherwise have the necessary resources or level of investment—to enter the globalized market.91
Despite this potential leveling of the playing field between MNEs and
small firms, research shows that at least 98% of the 700 firms with the
largest R&D expenditures are MNEs. These 700 firms account for close
to half of the world’s total R&D expenditure and more than two thirds of
the world’s business R&D.92 Recent evidence shows that these top
spenders are increasing their investments outside their home countries.93
IBM is one of the top twenty firms in R&D expenditures94 and it has truly internationalized its R&D strategy. Since 1995, it has operated a wholly owned R&D facility in China95 and currently has collaboratories underway in China, India, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Taiwan.96 Furthermore, IBM is working with Taiwan’s publicly funded Industrial Technology Reasearch Institute, its Institute for Information Industry, and several universities to research and develop healthcare services and devices geared toward preventive medicine and wellness.97
90. OECD, supra note 3, at 31. This phenomenon is interesting on a social level as
well. In what is basically a reverse “brain drain,” large companies invest resources and
train local talent in their capacity as local employees. Thus, the brightest minds continue
to boost their local economies and foster further growth in their countries. This is in stark
contrast to the common concern that MNEs hire local talent to work for their companies
outside of their home country (usually in a developed country) where they earn money
for the company and, ultimately, the developed nation. Alternatively, concerns have been
voiced that the emergence of India and China as seats of research and talent will lead to
further outsourcing by companies and now in a field of relatively high skill jobs. The
potential for this to erode national R&D infrastructures is unsettling to those on this side
of the debate. Thus, the open innovation trend has interesting implications for global
social policy.
91. Id. at 33.
92. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2005:
Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D, 119, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2005 (Oct. 29, 2005).
93. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], The Internationalisation of Business R&D: Evidence, Impacts and Implications, at 21 (2008).
94. UNCTAD, supra note 92, at 120.
95. Id. at 119.
96. Hamm, supra note 19, at 41.
97. See Dan Nystedt, Taiwan to Host IBM’s First Joint Healthcare IT Research Unit,
PCWORLD (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.pcworld.com/article/185193/taiwan; Press Release, IBM, IBM Research Collaborates with Leading Taiwanese Institutions to Deliver
Wellness-Centric Healthcare via Cloud Computing (Dec. 21, 2009), available at
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Taiwan is experienced in technology-driven health care services, and this
project explores the potential role of mobile devices, analytics, and cloud
computing in preventative medicine and illness management.98 Ultimately, the goal is to pioneer smarter solutions, test drive them in Taiwan, and
then work together to export them to the rest of the world.99
D. Open Innovation and Intellectual Property
The type and extent of open innovation strategy pursued in foreign
countries often reflects the country’s national intellectual property regime.100 In fact, intellectual property is at the heart of open innovation as
technologies or ideas being accessed, licensed, or sold are embodiments
of intellectual property. “[T]he open innovation paradigm . . . is as much
a change in the use, management, and employment of [intellectual property] as it is in technical and research driven generation of [intellectual
property].”101 With open innovation strategies, companies take a proactive approach to intellectual property, usually in the form of patents, as
an integral part of their technology strategy and capital creation.102 Patents are strategically utilized not only to leverage a firm’s own product
development, but also to profit off others’ uses of its ideas.103 Thus, firms
shop for patents that compliment their own innovations and also offer
unused technologies for more efficient allocation.
A clear example of intellectual property rights at the heart of an open
innovation strategy is that of pooled R&D. “[F]irms donate [intellectual
property] to the open-source project while exploiting the common benefits of all contributors to facilitate the sale of related products.”104 For
instance, IBM has donated 300 of its software patents to the public domain for anyone working on open source projects.105 Further, IBM employees are often tasked with contributing to open source software.106
These activities may seem counterintuitive for value creation; however,
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29086.wss; Yeshim Deniz, IBM to Deliver Healthcare Through Cloud Computing, AJAX WORLD MAG. (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://ca.sys-con.com/node/1227658.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. OECD, supra note 3, at 42.
101. WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 320.
102. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 56, 155.
103. Id.
104. WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 323.
105. OECD, supra note 3, at 104. IBM will retain the patents, but has agreed not to
seek royalties or place restrictions on their use, as long as they are used in open source
projects.
106. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 45.
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the donated intellectual property creates demand for related products and
services sold by IBM and fosters industry advancement and goodwill.107
In open source situations, the intellectual property created is nonproprietary and, therefore, the arrangement of each party’s rights is less
complex than in situations such as partnerships and collaborations.108 The
obvious question that all partnerships encounter is how to properly allocate the benefits of the partnership.109 IBM customizes each partnership
agreement,110 producing a range of results from publicly shared and
royalty free outputs to sponsored research where the output is intended to
be owned by one or both of the partners.111 However, one survey reports
that of 300 senior executives, 60% of them indicated that intellectual
property theft is the biggest risk in collaborating on innovation with international partners.112
Collaborative partnerships may require significant transfers of existing
intellectual property and the “know-how” or the specialized practical
skills necessary to utilize these shared technologies.113 Companies face
an increased risk of leakage of proprietary knowledge, involuntary spillovers, and potential loss of control.114 Further, intellectual property has
been described as “sticky” because exposure to the technology and
know-how pollutes the firm, resulting in an “embedding problem.” 115
Once an employee learns about the intellectual property, the knowledge
sticks with the employee and he or she unwittingly uses it in the future.116
The concern over this dissipation of know-how once prevented foreign
partnerships.117 Now, studies indicate that companies act strategically in
choosing where to operate abroad, taking account of national intellectual
107. See WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 325.
108. See Sawyer, supra note 2, at 317 (“It can become difficult even to identify what
the proper componential decomposition of a new innovation is. These realities provide
many challenges for IP, including how to determine what proportion of ownership rights
the creator of each individual idea should receive.”).
109. See OECD, supra note 3, at 42. Successful partnerships will discuss these issues
prior to starting the collaboration, otherwise serious breakdown often occurs. With today’s IP regime, though, the winner might always be the partner with the best contract
lawyer and the savviest understanding of the complex web of international patent laws.
110. IBM, supra note 74
111. Id.
112. EIU, supra note 57, at 2, 14.
113. OECD, supra note 3, at 34; see also Eric von Hippel, Cooperation Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading, 16 RES. POL’Y 291, 292 (1987).
114. OECD, supra note 3, at 41.
115. GENE SLOWINSKI & MATTHEW W. SAGAL, THE STRONGEST LINK: FORGING A
PROFITABLE AND ENDURING CORPORATE ALLIANCE 154–55 (2003).
116. Id.
117. OECD, supra note 3, at 42.

948

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:3

property regimes to determine what types of R&D to carry out.118 For
example, in emerging countries where intellectual property rights are
weak,119 a company will focus R&D on technologies that require complementary assets unavailable in the host country.120 Additionally, firms
employ various tactics to foster the trust and confidence necessary to facilitate a free flow of knowledge within the partnership. Nondisclosure,
confidentiality, and exclusivity agreements are often central in this endeavor.121
II. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Legal contracts between partners are a common business practice.
However, in the context of open innovation these contracts take on a central role as a means of facilitating the active use of intellectual property
assets.122 Businesses have adapted to meet the challenges of globalization
and increased competition by utilizing patents in ways other than for the
mere protection of ideas.123 Meanwhile, patent law around the world remains static and rooted in a singular logic. It aims to curb a perceived
market failure by rewarding inventors with a period of exclusivity in order to incentivize further innovation.124 However, this system is unlikely
to anticipate or be able to react to problems that arise from the offensive
use of intellectual property assets.125
Individual nations maintain their own national patent systems. There is
no global patent law, per se; instead, international patent law is com118. Id.
119. Some may argue that these countries deserve access to the technologies used in
the partnership for development purposes. Others will counter that the companies owning
the proprietary knowledge are not required to allow “free-riders,” even if we are talking
about a least developed country. Regardless of the “right answer” to this question, bringing advanced technology into a country for the first time can only have positive repercussions for those exposed to it due to the “leaky” and “sticky” nature of IP.
120. OECD, supra note 3, at 42.
121. Id. at 103.
122. Id.
123. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 81.
124. R. VAN WENDEL DE JOODE, J.A. DE BRUIJN & M.J.G. VAN EETEN, PROTECTING THE
VIRTUAL COMMONS: SELF-ORGANIZING OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE COMMUNITIES
AND INNOVATIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES 52 (2003); Sawyer, supra note 2, at
321. Admittedly, this is traditionally thought of as the U.S. perspective with other countries focusing on labor or natural law theories. However, TRIPs harmonization of national
laws has arguably established this utilitarian philosophy as the mainstay of international
patent law. Doris Estelle Long, “Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies
of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 243 (2002).
125. Cf. Sawyer, supra note 2, at 318 (“Many features of the current IP regime reward
behavior that blocks the natural flow of innovation in collaborative webs . . . .”).

2010]

OWNING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE

949

posed of various agreements that link these territorial laws together.
These agreements have successfully harmonized domestic laws more and
more over the years; however, important areas are still in discord and the
overall rationale behind patent law remains static. In order to understand
how patent law must change, it is important to know the foundation upon
which the existing laws are built.
The formal law of patents as we know it today began in the late fifteenth century in Venice as “an instrument designed to attract engineers
to the Republic.”126 Interestingly, this statute did not grant a monopoly to
the patentee but instead ensured royalties for compulsory licenses, a
more public policy oriented rationale.127 The notion of intellectual property as private property was popularized in America and eventually enshrined in The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (the “Paris Convention”) in 1883.128 Though the Paris Convention grants individuals from any member state equal protection under the
laws of any other member state,129 a look at the distinct patent laws of
individual states suggests that the underlying purpose of patent rights
remains in dispute.130
The Paris Convention is the “bedrock of the international patent system.”131 It commits its members to three key principles. First, members
must treat foreign inventors from member states no worse than domestic
126. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
415 (2d ed. 2008).
127. Id.
128. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, 828 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. Please
note that the Paris Convention underwent revision several times since its inception on
Mar. 20, 1883: Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900; Washington on Nov. 6, 1925; London on Jun.
2, 1934; Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1985; and Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Id.; see also
DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 421–24.
129. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 424.
130. Note, for example, that U.S. law grants patents to the first-to-invent, with contest
procedures to ensure the correct individual receives the patent and a tenancy-in-common
grant for joint inventors. On the other hand, all other foreign systems award patents to the
first-to-file, valuing the sharing of the invention over the protection of the “true” inventor. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 262 (2006), with Tokkyohō [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of
1959, art. 29(2) (amended 2006).
131. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 426; see also John R Thomas, Multinational Patent Acquisition and Enforcement: Public Policy Challenges and Opportunities for
Innovative Firms, in PATENTS: ISSUES AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 143, 159 (John V. Martin ed., 2002) (referring to the Convention as “the foundation patent harmonization treaty”); Robert R. Willis, International Patent Law: Should United States and Foreign Patent Laws Be Uniform? An Analysis of the Benefits, Problems, and Barriers, 10 N.C.J.L.
& TECH. 283, 288 (2009) (calling the Paris Convention the “foremost international intellectual property regime”).
AND POLICY
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inventors, and must provide them the same protections and the same
access to legal remedies (this is the “national treatment” provision).132
Second, national patent rights are independent of one another,133 thus,
each country must enforce them individually within the distinct patent
law regimes.134 Third, a patent seeker who files in a member country
must be given 12 months to file in another member country without prejudice regarding information that enters the public domain.135 Known as
the “international priority principle,” this provision is significant considering that many nations still have strict laws that any disclosure of an
invention prior to the filing of a patent defeats the patentability of the
invention.136 Thus, the priority provision allows the patent seeker to preserve the first filing date while arranging for filing abroad.137
Though the Paris Convention was a giant step toward alignment of national patent systems, the agreement fell short of any real substantive
harmonization, and it failed to streamline the patent application procedures and provide effective enforcement mechanisms. The latter issue
was addressed in the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), which
allows a single “international patent application” to be submitted to the
national offices of designated member countries.138 This simplifies the
application process and reduces costs. It is important to note, however,
that the international application does not result in a single, global patent
but rather commences national applications in jurisdictions that are
members of the PCT.139 Ultimately, it is still the decision of the national
patent authority whether to issue a patent and to protect the rights conferred.140
132. Paris Convention, supra note 128, art. 2.
133. Id. art. 4bis.
134. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 159.
135. Paris Convention, supra note 128, art. 4.
136. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), art. 54(2), concluded Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254 (as amended in 2000) [European Patent Convention] (“The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other
way, before the date of filing of the European patent application.”); Tokkyohō [Patent
Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, arts. 29(1), 30 (amended 2006) (disqualifying any invention
that was made publicly known more than six months prior to filing the patent in Japan).
137. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 160.
138. Patent Co-operation Treaty, done Jun. 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231; see also Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 160–61 (citing ABBOTT, FREDRICK ET AL.,
THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS
646 (1999)).
139. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 161; Willis, supra note 131, at 291.
140. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 211
(2008).
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The desire for substantive harmonization of patent laws was finally addressed in TRIPs under the WTO framework.141 This agreement, adopted
by more than 153 members,142 is the primary authority on international
patent law, as it directly incorporates the Paris Convention143 and also
provides minimum substantive standards, enforcement provisions, and a
dispute settlement mechanism.144 Though this agreement mandates that
members bring their national laws into harmonized compliance, there is
still considerable flexibility built into the agreement,145 and a variety of
issues remain the province of national law.
The TRIPs substantive standards provide that, at a minimum, members
must give patent rights for inventions in all fields of technology as long
as they are new, involve an inventive step, and are useful.146 With a few
exceptions to patentability,147 this standard clearly indicates the outer
parameters for which patents will be granted in exchange for disclosure.148 TRIPs enshrines the traditional utilitarian, market failure logic by
mandating—with a few exceptions149—the right to exclude others from
“making, using, offering for sale, selling[,] or importing” the patented
subject for at least 20 years.150 TRIPs also requires members to provide
minimum enforcement mechanisms domestically151 and provides access

141. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (2004) [hereinafter TRIPs].
142. See generally World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2009) (listing members as of July 23, 2008).
143. TRIPs, supra note 141, art 2.
144. Thomas, supra note 131, at 144, 163.
145. For example, Article 7 specifies that IP rights should be “conducive to social and
economic welfare.” Article 8 allows for the protection of public health and the promotion
of public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development.” Article 30 provides for “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.” And Article 66 allows grace periods for least-developed countries to
comply with the standards. TRIPs, supra note 141.
146. TRIPs, supra note 141, art. 27.
147. Id. art 27(2), (3) (providing exceptions to patentability for diagnostic, therapeutic,
and surgical methods for treating humans or animals; for biological processes for growing plants or breeding animals; and for interests such as avoiding serious prejudice to the
environment or protecting public order, morality, or human, animal, or plant life).
148. Id. art. 29 (“[A]n applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in
the art.”).
149. Id. art 30.
150. Id. arts. 28, 33; see Long, supra note 124, at 243.
151. TRIPs, supra note 141, art 41, 44–46.
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to the Dispute Settlement Body152 of the WTO, where the flex of other
trade measures can pressure compliance with intellectual property
laws.153
All in all, the Paris Convention, the PCT, and TRIPs together provide
the first steps towards a harmonized patent system. However, the international community continues to debate the future of patent law and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) is a forum in which
members frequently grapple with such issues. Created in 1967, this specialized agency of the United Nations has as its mandate to “promote the
protection of intellectual property throughout the world.”154 In this role,
the WIPO acts as the administrator of several intellectual property
agreements including the Paris Convention and the PCT.155 Additionally,
TRIPs provides for an ongoing relationship with WIPO; for instance,
WIPO members act as consultants regarding the implementation of
TRIPs provisions.156 WIPO also develops intellectual property policy and
serves as a forum for discussion of potential improvements to international intellectual property rights. It is in this vein that WIPO’s Standing
Committee on the Law of Patents has been addressing issues of harmonization.157 Nevertheless, to acquire, manage, and enforce patent rights
throughout the world is a complex and costly endeavor.158 Even firms
with the means to successfully achieve these ends may find the system
inefficient in or incapable of supporting their global innovation.159

152. Id. art 64.
153. Cf. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 140, at 200 (explaining that a members
protection of intellectual property rights plays a role in either encouraging or discouraging trade with other members); DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 126, at 777 (describing the
ability of members to retaliate against countries that refuse to comply with the agreement
through the suspension of other trade concessions or obligations).
154.What is WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
155. Id.
156. TRIPs, supra note 141, art 68.
157. World Intellectual Prop. Org., Substantive Patent Law Harmonization,
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/harmonization.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
158. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143–144.
159. C.f. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, PATENT REFORM IN THE 111TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 7 (2009)
(“[P]atent protection in a single jurisdiction is an inefficient method to protect the interest
of both domestic and international inventors.”); Sawyer, supra note 2, at 318 (“Current
policy favors linear, centralized innovation, and blocks the natural rhythm of the collaborative web.”).
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III. PATENT HARMONIZATION THROUGH THE LENS OF OPEN
INNOVATION
It has been stated that “[t]he continued need for harmonization remains
prevalent due to the globalization of commerce, the reduction of trade
barriers, and the need for stability and predictability in international patent protection.”160 However, despite the forces driving the international
buzz over harmonization,161 the conversation largely fails to consider the
implications of globalized commerce for patent reform. Open innovation,
as one such trend in global business, should be considered both for the
insight it can provide on patent reform, as well as for the impact that
proposed harmonization can have on the stability and predictability of
patent law in use. Harmonization debates generally focus on broader issues such as patent quality, costs, and scope of patentability with a specific focus on differences in patent priority, grace periods, and enforcement.162 These issues must be reexamined through the lens of open innovation.
A. Patent Priority
The United States is the only patent-issuing nation in the world to
maintain a first-to-invent priority system.163 In the event that more than
one application is filed in the U.S. claiming the same invention, the patent is awarded to the applicant who can establish the earliest “date of
conception, and reduction to practice of the invention,” as well as reasonable diligence to patent.164 Outside the U.S., the first-to-file priority
system grants the patent to the first applicant, regardless of whether he
was actually the original inventor.165 On the most basic level, the coexistence of these two systems could result in the award of patent rights

160. Ryan M. Corbett, Note, Harmonization of US and Foreign Patent Law and H.R.
2795: The Patent Reform Act of 2005, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 717, 722–23 (2006).
161. See generally Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, S. 515, S. 610, 111th Cong.
(2009) (bills in both houses proposing significant changes to initiate some level of harmonization); EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that “European
patents are granted on the basis of harmonised law codified in the European Patent Convention” and exploring the potential for future international patent regimes); World Intellectual Prop. Org., supra note 157 (providing background on the international body’s
work toward harmonization).
162. See Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 151–58; see also SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra
note 159; Willis, supra note 131.
163. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 152.
164. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006); see also SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 13.
165. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 153.
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to different individuals for the same invention.166 Proponents of the firstto-invent argue that it is a more equitable system, ensuring that the original inventor secures the patent.167 Supporters of the first-to-file system
believe that it provides greater legal certainty within innovative industries because the date of priority is stable and easily discernable.168
Moreover, it reduces the complexity and limits the delays and the costs
that arise when the true inventor is contested.169
The priority system has several implications for open innovation. In a
world where intellectual property assets are used offensively (rather than
merely guarded jealously) the international community must consider the
best way to manage licensing. Certainty of patent ownership facilitates
efficient transfers of licensing and technology.170 However, the first-toinvent system breeds uncertainty in a manner that is particularly harsh on
small firms. When attempting to sell or license internally developed intellectual property, small firms may have reduced bargaining power since
“true” ownership may be contested.171 Alternatively, lengthy and costly
proceedings are often mandatory to prove priority of inventorship, and
this leaves smaller (perhaps geographically removed) partners at a distinct disadvantage. In collaborative partnerships, the evidence necessary
to win such a contest may be harder to manage or even inaccessible after
the alliance ends. Further, U.S. law is ambiguous with respect to the level
of contribution required by a team member to qualify as an inventor, and
this fosters uncertainty and apprehension during collaboration.172 Hence,
166. Id. at 143, 172. Consider the following example that takes place among applicants
from member nations of the previously mentioned treaties: applicant A files for a patent
in country Y (a first-to-file country), as well as in country Z (a first-to-invent country).
One month later, applicant B also files for a patent in both countries Y and Z claiming the
exact same invention as applicant A. In country Y, applicant A clearly wins the patent as
well as all subsequent patents filed in first-to-file countries using the priority principle
under the Paris Convention. However, if applicant B can in fact prove that it is the first
inventor, applicant B will win patent protection in country Z. Thus, different parties hold
the rights to the same invention in different nations, and the international community
lacks legal certainty.
167. Willis, supra note 131, at 295.
168. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 14.
169. Id.
170. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 184 (stating that patents can facilitate licensing or sale of technology but only when boundaries are well defined).
171. Cf. id. at 167 (“Small inventors especially suffer because fuzzy boundaries mean
that they realize less value from licensing or selling their patents.”).
172. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH 15 (2005). Further, it should be noted that the U.S. system raises issues of apprehension and uncertainty even once the collaboration is complete. Where both parties to an invention are named as “joint inventors,” they each, indi-

2010]

OWNING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE

955

pre-research contracting is exceedingly important; meanwhile, this also
carries serious implications for unsophisticated parties.173
B. Grace Periods
Grace periods are another hotly contested issue within international
negotiations. After a public disclosure of an invention (through publication or sale) by either the inventor or a third-party, the U.S. grants the
inventor a grace period of one year to file a patent application.174 Foreign
jurisdictions are not as lenient. In Japan, an inventor has six months after
personally disclosing the invention and no grace period at all for disclosures by third parties,175 and the EU holds that “any sales or publication
of an invention anywhere in the world prior to the filing date defeats the
patentability of an invention.”176 Proponents of the grace period argue
that it allows leeway for inventors who are unfamiliar with foreign patent
regimes and that it encourages public testing of inventions.177 Critics argue that grace periods only serve to elongate the patent term and increase
commercial uncertainties.178
Of particular interest in the case of open innovation are the debates
concerning academic and scientific communities. Though these communities have long been partners in innovation, the academic research
community relies on norms that contravene many patent law principles.179 Based on the notion that the best way to further science is to
share research results, academic researchers widely believe that new
knowledge should be shared as quickly as possible.180 Though academics
are fairly patent-savvy today,181 grace periods help support the continued
practice of quick publication of academic research results.182 Critics of
vidually, have exclusive rights granted under the patent. As with the real property concept of a “tenancy in common,” each can do with the patent what he will, including licensing or selling the innovation to his or her partner’s competitors. Clearly, this system
raises some concerns for open innovation.
173. Id.
174. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
175. Tokkyohō [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, arts. 29(1), 30 (amended 2006).
176. Thomas, supra note 132, at 153; see also European Patent Convention, supra note
136, art. 54(2).
177. JOSEPH STRAUS, EXPERT OPINION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN
EUROPEAN LAW 50 (2000).
178. JAN E.M. GALAMA, EXPERT OPINION ON THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE
INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN EUROPEAN LAW 13 (2000).
179. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 (1987).
180. Id.
181. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 9.
182. STRAUS, supra note 177, at 54.
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grace periods contend that academics and scientists choosing to participate in the commercial sphere must accept the legal rules that govern that
sphere and adjust their behavior accordingly.183 However, businesses are
increasingly reaching out to fund university R&D,184 though it has been
argued that “[u]niversities are less well equipped to employ a ‘proactive’ [intellectual property rights] strategy.”185
Ultimately, the patent regime should help ensure that collaborative
partnerships are mutually beneficial. Where one partner adheres to the
norms of a specific community, the grant of patent rights should not be
predicated upon the relinquishment of community norms.186 Thus, as
long as the norms of these communities do mandate prompt publication
of findings, grace periods would facilitate open collaboration.187
C. Enforcement
TRIPs provides for the first international dispute resolution mechanism
for issues regarding intellectual property violations. However, disputes at
the WTO are brought by and against nations, and, while they regard individual instances of violation, the WTO adjudicators are not able to
coerce nations into providing remedies,188 and they do not have any true
law-making authority.189 Therefore, patent litigation largely takes place
183. GALAMA, supra note 178, at 23.
184. De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 11.
185. OECD supra note 3, at 116 (“[For universities,] management of IP in an open innovation context—as opposed to the technology transfer approach of licensing patents—
remains a challenge, especially in their interactions with firms.”).
186. The choice to publish rather than patent does not always rest on community
norms. Sometimes it is in a company’s economic interest to publish knowledge so that it
is available to everyone without cost. This would be the case where the company knows
it wouldn’t be able to maintain exclusivity for long. Thus, it is in the firm’s interest to
make sure no one else tries to patent the idea while also promoting industry advancement
through disclosure.
187. Some critics argue further that, for the reliability of knowledge production, it is
essential that big businesses do not impede access to knowledge for the sole purpose of
commercial exploitation. This is interesting considering that the “public good” of knowledge dissemination is the goal of patent law; however, these critics believe that the regime may actually serve as an impediment to that very goal. See Paul A. David, Will
Building “Good Fences” Really Make “Good Neighbors” in Science? 2 (Stanford Inst.
for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.00-33, 2001) (citing Laxenburg Statement on the Global Science System, (Oct. 10, 1997)).
188. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 140, at 52 (explaining that the WTO system
works by peer pressure rather than any inherent enforcement authority).
189. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 art. IX(2) (granting exclusive authority to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council to interpret the agreements of the WTO); Panel Report,
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8 (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) (interpreting art.
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in the national court systems, subject to national patent laws. Further,
patent holders bear the responsibility for monitoring their own patents in
each individual country.190 Both of these activities are costly and have
implications for actual patent value. It has been stated, as an industry rule
of thumb, that $1.5 million in legal fees can be expected in the course of
defending any given patent infringement lawsuit.191 Hence, some have
found that litigation costs are in fact a disincentive to innovate.192 One
study found that “worldwide patent profits were about 6 percent of R&D
while litigation costs were also about 13 percent . . . that is, patents acted
as a net tax on R&D.”193
Thus, for any party using open innovation, the threat of litigation and
the cost of monitoring worldwide patents may be prohibitive. Further,
with open innovation, the need for protection extends beyond the issuance of the patent itself and must also contemplate an increase in contractual exchanges of intellectual property rights. Small firms may be at a
particular disadvantage in terms of protecting their rights since they are
not as well positioned to spread the cost of litigation over large numbers
of patents.194 This has implications for the relative bargaining power of
different sized partners in a collaborative partnership. While a firm like
IBM may have a handle on monitoring and protecting its intellectual
property, a small firm from a remote location might not stand a chance.
Additionally, though the Paris Convention assures equal access to protection and remedies for all members, the practicalities of that access are
likely to prove prohibitive.
D. Patent Quality
Patent Quality is a concern that arises concurrently with many of the
above-mentioned issues. For example, some commentators argue that
shifting to a first-to-file system encourages a rush to the patent office at
the expense of patent quality.195 Grace periods allow for the receipt of
feedback on inventions, which would facilitate perfection of patents prior
IX(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement as a deliberate grant of exclusive interpretive authority, thus, precluding the existence of the authority elsewhere); see Strandburg, supra note
2, at 308 (“TRIPs suffers from a law-making deficit because of the rarity and nonprecedential character of WTO panel decisions.”).
190. THOMAS, supra note 172, at 7.
191. Mark H. Webbink, A New Paradigm for Intellectual Property Rights in Software,
DUKE LAW AND TECH. REV., May 1, 2005, 15, 22.
192. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 14.
193. Id. at 145 (emphasis in original).
194. Id. at 178.
195. Thomas, supra note 131, at 143, 153.
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to filing and would thus enhance patent quality.196 This could, in turn,
reduce litigation because poor patent quality often leads to inadvertent
infringement..197 Poor patent quality cannot be tied to any one source,
though the flood of patent applications in recent years does not bode well
for quality control. Patent boundaries are often fuzzy and their scope can
be hard to determine, which give rise to inadvertent infringement.198 Further, unclear rights raise bargaining costs and heighten the chance that
deals will break down.199 Thus, it becomes “increasingly costly to find
and negotiate the necessary patent license in advance of . . . technology
development and adoption decisions.”200 To better support the increased
movement of technology in light of open innovation, patent reform must
focus on enhancing patent quality.
E. Open Innovation Raises Additional Concerns with International Patent Law
In addition to these common areas of focus for patent harmonization,
open innovation raises unique questions about the appropriateness of the
international patent regime. Some scholars argue that advances like open
innovation do not readily fit under the sales-oriented, proprietary model
of intellectual property, which underlies agreements such as TRIPs.201
TRIPs applies a one-size-fits-all standard of strong protection for all
technologies, reflecting its primary goal as an instrument of trade.202 It is
questionable whether an instrument of trade is even an appropriate means
to regulate innovation since “innovative practices are simply not welldescribed as means by which goods invented and produced in one place
are sold in another.”203 Further, as previously discussed, the WTO seems
ill-equipped as an adjudicatory body for disputes arising among patent
holders.
The particular grounds covered—or neglected—by TRIPs are also
problematic in the context of open innovation. One basic concern is that
an across-the-board mandate of a minimum of 20 years of exclusory protection could be excessive. With product life cycles drastically short196. Cf. id. (“[Grace periods] encourage[] the development of inventions that require a
certain amount of public testing before the invention can be said to be complete.”).
197. Cf. Schacht & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 5–6.
198. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 22.
199. Id. at 21.
200. Id. at 46.
201. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 284.
202. Id. at 298; Long, supra note 124, at 243 (“TRIPS . . . undeniably established that
intellectual property protection is a trade matter.”).
203. Id. at 16.

2010]

OWNING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE

959

ened—for example, most software is only used for two to three
years204—patents could bar further innovation on a given technology
even if that technology is no longer actively used. This raises another
concern regarding the cumulative nature of inventions.205 The highly
complex nature of products today is often the result of a cumulative
process206 whereby knowledge from one innovation becomes input for
subsequent research.207 This interdependence of knowledge creation raises questions of infringement protection. Notably, TRIPs does not set an
upper bound for intellectual property protection which creates a potential
holdout problem.208 Original patent holders are able to block future development and capture a disproportionate amount of the value of new
innovations. Future inventors are also left with an often impossible task
of obtaining licenses from disperse and numerous ex ante patent owners.209 Open innovation only further exacerbates this problem, though
some companies have tried to remedy the situation by creating patent
pools of the intellectual property required for any given product. Nevertheless, patent reform must contemplate better systems to support cumulative knowledge production.
One of the most important assumptions undergirding the international
patent regime is that patents are a positive incentive to innovate and that
the inventor would have no means to recoup his investment without a
patent.210 However, some research indicates that an open innovation regime may in fact be superior as it results in lower innovation costs, as
well as lower imitation costs.211 This finding is premised on the assumption that innovators are able to gain advantages simply by being the first
to discover such knowledge.212 R&D managers have themselves indicated that other means of appropriating value—for instance, lead-time
204. VAN WENDEL DE JOODE, DE BRUIJN & VAN EETEN, supra note 124, at 62.
205. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 1, at 88.
206. Id.
207. David, supra note 187, at 3; see Sawyer, supra note 2, at 313 (“In a collaborative
web, each innovation builds incrementally on a long history of prior innovations. The
creative products that are successful in the market rarely spring to life full-grown.”).
208. See Strandburg, supra note 2, at 302.
209. Sawyer, supra note 2, at 319–20 (“[I]t can take a year or more to contact everyone
with an ownership right, find out the price, and get all of the release forms signed.”);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698, 698 (1998) (describing the granting of patents as creating an anticommons in biomedical research).
210. Rufus Pollock, Innovation, Imitation and Open Source 2 n.3 (Econ. & Econometrics Research Inst., Research Paper No. 20/2008, 2008).
211. Id. at 16.
212. Id. at 17.

960

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:3

advantages, complementary products, or trade secrecy—are more effective than patents in earning returns on investment.213 These mechanisms
lend themselves well to open innovation strategies, which suggests that
open innovation may be steering companies away from proprietary patent models. Further, in the absence of patent rights, there has not been a
corresponding dip in innovation,214 while stringent enforcement of intellectual property rights has actually blocked innovation.215 Along with the
factors listed above, market forces may step in to ensure an optimal level
of invention.216 Notably, thriving open-source communities provide a
prime example of continued innovation in the absence of intellectual
property rights.
IV. CHANGING THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT PATENT RIGHTS
The debate around patent harmonization should be framed with innovation in mind. However, for the benefit of the ever-evolving global
business landscape, the discussion on patent reform must shift to reexamine the underlying rationale of patent law. Open innovation is the next
chapter of global R&D, and, in this technological world, businesses must
adapt or retreat. When businesses work together to license their unused
intellectual property and to seek needed intellectual property from others,
the world of technology and innovation multiplies exponentially.217 Still,
the interconnectedness of these businesses creates dependence; thus,
these businesses need trust and clarity in order to thrive. Patent law continues to be based on static notions of incentives to innovate, inventor
rewards, and public disclosure.218 The time has come to reevaluate this
one-size-fits-all system 219 and redefine the goals of patent law. To better
support today’s global businesses, the patent system should aim to clarify
boundaries, simplify processes, and facilitate an ever growing intellectual
property marketplace.
Patents are not always easily defined, and the lack of notice within the
system makes infringement almost inevitable.220 As with real property,
the notice system should serve as a warning to potential trespassers and
213. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 89.
214. Cf. THOMAS, supra note 172, at 5 (“Some of our most dynamic industries arose at
a time when patent rights were unavailable or uncertain.”).
215. Sawyer, supra note 2, at 317.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Cf. OECD, supra note 3, at 45 (discussing the emergence of intermediary markets
and brokers for ideas in response to open innovation strategies).
218. VAN WENDEL DE JOODE, DE BRUIJN & VAN EETEN, supra note 124, at 52–53.
219. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 159, at 11.
220. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 46, 147.
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should aid in the movement of resources to the most efficient users. This
would make technology markets more efficient221 and reduce the transaction costs of open innovation. As explained by Ronald Coase, “transaction costs” include the costs of: searching, information provision, bargaining, decision-making, and contracting.222 Through a better international notice system, search costs would be reduced as parties could easily access the patents they need or find buyers for those patents they are
looking to sell. Making information accessible to all parties would equalize bargaining power and reduce litigation costs from inadvertent infringement. Open innovation also raises the need for more robust licensing mechanisms and patent registries to help facilitate connections and
the efficient allocation of resources.
This signals the emergence of an intellectual property marketplace.
Many prematurely assumed that the marketplace was already here and
patent brokers and online innovation marketplaces emerged to cater to
the new clientele.223 However, key problems bar the emergence of a
functional intellectual property market.224 A general lack of information
and a lack of standards for valuation make the coordination of market
exchange difficult.225 Additionally, in a world of virtual interconnectedness, assets are now created and held in virtual spaces, and this gives rise
to questions of origin and jurisdiction. An effective patent system will
become not only a defense mechanism, but will also be expected to define and regulate an emergent innovation market.
One proposed solution is to set up an administrative type of approach
that would allow for continuous adjustments to a global innovation policy.226 This system would rely on WIPO as a locus of innovation policy
tasked with the interpretation of TRIPs’ flexibilities and exceptions in
accordance with the needs of the innovation community.227 Ultimately,
amendments to TRIPs could be made to extend exceptions for innovation, and WIPO’s administrative role would expand to vet these exceptions.228 This is an interesting suggestion and a potentially viable solution. However, while innovation is the focus, this focus is still situated
221. Id. at 21.
222. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW, ANTITRUST LAW, AND SAFETY REGULATIONS
244 (Jenny B. Wahl ed, 1998).
223. See Terra, supra note 3, at 7 (detailing the advent of virtual auctions and online
showroom websites).
224. CHESBROUGH, supra note 13, at 74.
225. Id. at 75.
226. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 286.
227. Id. at 24.
228. Id.
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within the proprietary, trade-based paradigm of TRIPs. And, while enhancing the flexibilities of this international instrument on an ad hoc basis may provide innovators some protection, it is unlikely to encourage
and support the continued development of innovation strategies.
It is important to consider a way forward that will avoid further entrenchment of outdated intellectual property rationales that are likely to stifle
the evolution of innovation.229 Any successful solution will have to be
flexible. Even the WIPO delegates have pointed out that “[i]n view of the
rapid technological innovation and the social and economic challenges,
the function, value[,] and impact of the patent system need to be constantly adjusted . . . .”230 Further, it has been suggested that the effectiveness of patents depends largely on the implementing institution.231 Not
only must a new institution other than the WTO be named as the arbiter
of patents, but the definition of “effective” must be reexamined as well.
As noted, owners of intellectual property are taking increasingly proactive roles in the management of their assets under open innovation. The
ethos of patent law must shift accordingly to “[redefine] ‘ownership’ to
focus on the right to distribute, rather than the right to exclude.”232 Patent
law is ripe for a paradigm shift akin to that of innovation with a focus on
a more comprehensive notion of the law’s end goals.
CONCLUSION
The lone inventor no longer dominates the field of innovation. In fact,
the companies who command these activities are beginning to embody
the fundamental principle that two heads are better than one.233 Yet, the
patent system, built to encourage innovation and reward inventors, remains faithful to the lone inventor. Thus, patents have become, at times,
obstacles to successful innovation rather than incentives.234 Firms respond to the failure of the patent system by finding alternative means of
protection and value creation.235 However, because intellectual property
229. David, supra note 187, at 5.
230. R&D, Innovation and Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/research.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2010).
231. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 93.
232. Peter Evans, The New Commons vs. The Second Enclosure Movement: Comments
on an Emerging Agenda for Development Research, STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV., June 2005,
at 85, 87.
233. IBM Business Innovation Centre: Collaborate Globally, IBM, http://www07.ibm.com/innovation/in/exploit/cbp.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
234. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 209, at 698–99; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 14; Sawyer, supra note 2, at 317–18.
235. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37, at 89.
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assets remain at the center of open innovation strategies, complete abandonment of the patent regime is not a viable solution.
Open innovation signals a shift in focus from isolated product development to faster, increasingly proactive management of intellectual
property assets.236 Firms look “outside-in” for knowledge and technology
to compliment their internal efforts, and they look “inside-out” to capitalize on others’ uses of their unused intellectual property.237 Though businesses have long employed these tactics, the rate at which they occur
today—and the overall integration of the strategy into business models—
signals a new era of R&D.238 Firms can no longer deny the importance of
knowledge produced outside their four walls, and those that have learned
to efficiently locate and integrate this knowledge have found a competitive edge. Today, complex technologies composed of multiple patents
and ideas are created faster, produced faster, and, ultimately, replaced
faster. The key to this cycle is the proactive, offensive use and management of intellectual property rights.239
Patent laws remain rooted in a traditional notion of reactive, defensive
exclusion of others.240 In fact, the regime offers no affirmative rights to
inventors—it merely offers the right to prevent others from exploiting
one’s invention.241 This and other substantive minimum mandates in the
TRIPs agreement were heralded in the international arena as a great step
forward. However, the harmonization debate has neglected changing
global trends for too long. To continue to root patent law in a proprietary,
sales-oriented model of intellectual property242 is to ignore the full potential of innovation and intellectual property.
At the least, the debate over patent harmonization should be refocused
through a new lens. The push to coordinate national regimes must keep
in mind the ways in which these rights are utilized, the different players
who use the system, and the clarity needed to meet users’ varying goals.
However, if patent harmonization continues to rely on the nineteenth
century rationale, open innovation may lead companies away from the
236. See OECD, supra note 3, at 103; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra
note 3, at 7; WEST & GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 320.
237. OECD, supra note 3, at 18.
238. Id. at 24; De Backer, Lopez-Bassols & Martinez, supra note 3, at 7; see WEST &
GALLAGHER, supra note 15, at 320.
239. CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 155 (noting a shift from intellectual property
rights as a means to control to a means of value creation).
240. VAN WENDEL DE JOODE, DE BRUIJN & VAN EETEN, supra note 124, at 52.
241. TRIPs, supra note 142, at art. 28 (mandating that members provide patent rights
that “confer exclusive rights . . . to prevent third parties . . . from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing”).
242. Strandburg, supra note 2, at 284.
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use of patents. Patent reform should thus reevaluate the underlying goals
of patent law and recognize that innovation does not always have to result in product creation to generate economic value. With this understanding, patent law can move in a new direction with an aim to further
knowledge production, ease the sharing of ideas, and promote and police
the growing international intellectual property market.
The lone inventor is not extinct. She continues to discover radical new
ideas and technologies that change our lives. However, today, this inventor is not alone; she exists in a network of interconnected knowledge
producers. The inventor thrives, despite the stunted growth of the patent
law meant to support her. Patent reform must take up the torch and adapt
to the globalizing world.
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